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  T
he old model of physician as 
authority ﬁ  gure dispensing 
advice and recommendations 
in the expectation that these will be 
followed precisely by patients has, for 
the most part, fallen out of favor. Such 
an image of physician as benevolent 
(or beneﬁ  cent) dictator has been 
challenged by concern for patient 
autonomy, and shared decision making 
(SDM) has largely been adopted as an 
ideal way for physicians and patients 
to join together whenever there are 
decisions that need to be made about 
management of health care issues. 
SDM, in its best form, requires an 
informed and skillful physician, who 
is aware of the best available scientiﬁ  c 
evidence from clinical research, and is 
expert at communicating with patients 
in a meaningful, comprehensive, and 
non-distorted manner [1,2].
    Such a physician must also be 
familiar with a series of concepts 
related to risk, rather than merely a 
set of facts. In the case of a choice 
about use of a screening test, an 
ideal physician would understand 
the generic circumstances in which 
screening is likely to be helpful or 
harmful, available data about the 
speciﬁ  c screening test, and subsequent 
possible interventions should it 
prove to be positive. This physician 
must also understand the problems 
patients typically have when trying to 
comprehend medical, and numerical, 
information, as well as the potential 
biases introduced during most doctor–
patient communication [3–6]. Finally, 
he or she must attempt to understand 
the personal values and preferences of 
the patient, and to ensure that these 
are incorporated into the ﬁ  nal decision 
(all the while being aware of his or her 
own values and preferences, so as to 
contribute as a trusted advisor, rather 
than as a mere robotic provider of 
information). 
    There are, in actual practice, many 
other limits to what is euphemistically 
called “informed” decision making. 
For many clinical questions, available 
evidence is insufﬁ  cient or possibly 
even misleading. Most physicians 
are not ideally informed about the 
details of many clinical questions, lack 
sophistication in interpreting clinical 
research, are poorly conversant with 
the categorization of test characteristics 
and the application of Bayesian 
thinking, and may be ill-prepared to 
consider ethical problems that arise 
from many decisions. Patients, likewise, 
are frequently poorly informed, at 
best, or even misinformed because 
they have heard biased information 
from interested parties, such as direct-
to-consumer advertising or advocacy 
groups [7]. Many patients do not have 
sufﬁ  cient educational background 
to understand easily and quickly 
the complex issues that are often 
involved in medical decisions—nor in 
many cases are they even aware that 
such decisions can be complex and 
frequently do not reﬂ  ect a single “right 
answer.” To make matters worse, there 
is rarely adequate time to spend on 
the many aspects of such a delicate 
consultation.
    Although SDM is now identiﬁ  ed as a 
desirable goal in many medical circles, 
a simpler process of informed consent 
may be appropriate, or even ideal, 
in “high-consensus” scenarios, such 
as when a vast majority of reasonable 
and educated physicians and patients 
would be expected to agree that the 
likelihood of beneﬁ  t outweighs the risk 
of harm with a particular management 
strategy, compared with any other 
strategy. But even efforts to “inform” 
patients are frequently not observed 
or are honored in the breach. In 
many instances, a physician will seek 
to obtain “informed consent” simply 
by presenting a scenario along the 
lines of “here’s what we have to do, 
and why” [6]. This may or may not be 
accompanied by a brief mention of the 
possible risks of the proposed strategy, 
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  Figure 1.   Pie Charts of Relative Risk for an 
Average 65-Year-Old Man, whether or Not 
He Opts for PSA Screening for Prostate 
Cancer
      Based on the best information available as of 
November 2005, the accuracy of which should 
be periodically revisited. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0744
and in rare cases, even by a very brief 
mention of potential alternatives—
although this last element would 
typically be followed by a description 
of why such alternatives are not really 
reasonable.
    Even when SDM seems ideal—as 
with a “low-consensus” scenario, a non-
emergent situation, a patient capable 
of understanding a reasonable amount 
of information, and particularly 
an instance where an individual’s 
personal values would be expected to 
weigh strongly—the barriers to such 
a process are obviously profound.  
Perhaps the greatest impediment 
involves the difﬁ  culty of providing 
information in a way that patients 
can understand, and which does not 
bias their response. Lack of time is 
not the only hurdle in such a process; 
there are many well-described ways 
(labeling, framing effect, etc.) in which 
standard communication can distort 
the manner in which information is 
perceived [3–6]. This is exacerbated 
by all sorts of problems related to most 
people’s (doctors’ as well as patients’) 
difﬁ  culties in making sense of numbers. 
Most people also have difﬁ  culty 
understanding concepts of probability 
and risk, particularly as they relate to 
outcomes that are ultimately binary in 
any given individual. 
    Finally, attempts to “balance” 
possible harms and beneﬁ  ts associated 
with various approaches basically 
involve giving all potential outcomes—
both good and bad—some artiﬁ  cial 
weight, perhaps calculated in light of 
the exploration of a separate set of 
“patient values,” and then attempting 
to determine which possible alternative 
strategy is “preferred” by comparing 
the calculated pluses and minuses 
[8–10]. Such techniques are commonly 
employed in clinical research, where 
“quality-adjusted life years” and the 
“standard gamble,” for example, each 
rely on our ability to “measure” various 
harms and beneﬁ  ts against some 
outside “gold standard.” This is fraught 
with hazard, of course, because asking 
individuals to estimate something on 
the order of “how many years of being 
alive, but in chronic pain, would you 
give up to attain one extra year of 
‘perfect health’” is confounded not 
only by individual variation, the degree 
of chronic pain, the quality of life if 
health is “perfect,” and a person’s 
baseline state of health or disability, but 
also by the impossibility, for most of 
us, of truly understanding the terms of 
such a question.
    Many of us also have trouble 
understanding numbers, and what 
they actually imply, particularly in the 
context of risk and probability. It is 
hard for anyone to comprehend the 
difference between a 7% chance and 
an 8% chance—is there a meaningful 
difference?—and this is exacerbated 
when we try to deal in more extreme 
probabilities, such as “3 in 10,000.” 
There is no “unbiased” way to present 
“a 4% chance of death” as opposed 
to “a 96% chance of survival,” even 
though we are likely to hear these 
two versions of this one piece of 
information very differently. Some 
recent efforts to stress absolute, 
rather than relative, changes in risk, 
are helpful, and the use of “number 
needed to treat,” for both beneﬁ  t 
and harm, can allow us to put all the 
effects of a given strategy into some 
perspective. But even this is far from 
optimal, since it requires us to try 
to balance equations like “one extra 
patient in 250 will not have a heart 
attack, while one extra patient in 12 
will stop the medication due to adverse 
effects, and one extra in 1,000 will 
develop kidney failure.” Furthermore, 
such “explanations” only help to 
understand   population   risks, and don’t 
help an individual patient choose 
between management strategies that 
each have a unique set of potential 
beneﬁ  ts and harms.
    We therefore felt that it would 
be useful to create a tool whereby 
patients could make a choice between 
different strategies, based on a simple 
visualization of the probable outcomes 
associated with each of them. There 
is some evidence that visual tools, of 
various sorts, can enhance aspects of 
communication about risk [11]; in 
addition, we thought it important that 
the tool in question not require efforts 
to weigh, indirectly, various harms and 
beneﬁ  ts, or to understand concepts 
of probability and risk, but to rely 
simply on a   direct   appreciation of the 
differences in likely outcomes. Thus we 
created the “roulette wheel” model of 
probabilities, which provides viewers a 
simple visual tool upon which to base 
choices. (Of course the utility of this 
tool may be diminished among patients 
with visual impairment, such as color-
blindness, or perhaps cataracts.)
    For demonstration purposes, for the 
rest of this discussion, we present what 
we feel are reasonable estimates, on 
the basis of available evidence, about 
the effects of ﬁ  rst-time prostate-speciﬁ  c 
antigen (PSA) screening for prostate 
cancer in an asymptomatic 65-year-old 
man, using the visual tools described 
below. Our numbers are based on the 
following assumptions, taken as much 
as possible from the medical literature: 
the prevalence of prostate cancer 
that would be fatal within 10 years, if 
untreated, is 2%; the prevalence of 
prostate cancer that would not be fatal 
within 10 years is 20%; the sensitivity 
of a PSA screening test is 100% for 
the fatal form of cancer and 30% for 
the nonfatal form; treatment results 
in a 50% reduction in the chances of 
dying from an otherwise fatal cancer; 
and the chances of suffering erectile 
dysfunction or incontinence because 
of treatment is 58% [12–14]. For 
this paper, we chose to assume that 
treatment of a PSA-detected cancer 
has beneﬁ  t, although this is currently 
uncertain, because otherwise (no 
beneﬁ  t, real harm) the choice not 
to offer or undergo screening would 
be straightforward. We have not 
considered such issues as cost, patient 
anxiety, problems with false negative 
tests, or adverse effects of biopsy in this 
model. All the tools described in this 
paper can be adapted to represent any 
current clinical question.
    In this paper, all numbers are 
presented as point-estimates. Modern 
computer technology, however, allows 
these tools, when displayed on an 
internet Web site (http:⁄⁄edoctoring.
ncl.ac.uk/System_Check/
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030137.g002
  Figure 2.   Dartboards of Relative Risks for 
an Average 65-Year-Old Man, whether or 
Not He Opts for PSA Screening for Prostate 
Cancer
      Based on the best information available as of 
November 2005, the accuracy of which should 
be periodically revisited. 
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psa_detect_html; click on “Roulette 
Wheels”) or computer hard disk, to 
respond to changes in any and all of 
the assumptions being made, about 
such things as test characteristics, 
treatments, and outcomes, allowing 
for an inﬁ  nite number of sensitivity 
analyses. Thus, both physicians and 
patients can work with not only a base 
set of probabilities derived from “best 
current evidence,” but also with the 
new sets of probable outcomes that 
would pertain if they wished to imagine 
the “best” and “worst” scenarios, using 
conﬁ  dence intervals from clinical 
research, or to see what would be 
relevant for an individual whose 
baseline risk was higher or lower than 
that of an average member of a large 
cohort, or if new and better evidence is 
published, or if new and better tests, or 
treatments, become available.
  The  Visual  Tools
    The most basic precursor of the 
roulette wheel is a simple pie chart 
(Figure 1), in which best estimates 
of various outcomes associated with 
different possible strategies can be 
depicted. When pie charts for two 
distinct strategies are shown side 
by side, the increase or decrease in 
likelihood of any particular outcome 
is easily and immediately visible to the 
observer. But presenting information 
in terms of two neighboring pie 
charts is suboptimal, because it 
fails to engage the viewer in terms 
of the relative   risk   associated with 
each of different options. Asking a 
patient to place himself in one of two 
populations, based on their respective 
population-based outcomes, is unlikely 
to simplify patient choice. The 
identical information, presented on 
dartboards (Figure 2), should be far 
more understandable to most patients, 
because most people would have little 
trouble with the concept that the result 
of throwing a dart would be generally 
proportional to the areas on a given 
board that provide a good reward 
(as in a high score) or a bad one (or 
even a punishment). To make the 
concept more familiar, and to increase 
the understanding that there is a risk 
involved with any “throw,” we spread 
the possible outcomes throughout the 
360 degrees of the chart, in proportion 
to their likelihood of occurring (based 
on the numbers derived as per above), 
for the strategy in question. (We 
understand that as the risks of different 
outcomes are randomly distributed 
around the dartboard, their relative 
areas may not be as obvious as they 
would be if grouped together; on the 
other hand, we feel this arrangement 
is more visually understandable, 
particularly in terms of expressing 
the likelihood of “risk” of any given 
outcome.)
    Using this model, a patient would be 
asked to choose from among two (or 
more) competing dartboards the one 
at which he would be most comfortable 
aiming. In each case, in the example, 
most of the boards are covered with 
green, representing healthy survival, 
but each has a few dangerous areas 
that represent either morbidity 
(incontinence or impotence, in yellow) 
or mortality (in red). The “do a PSA” 
dartboard in Figure 2 (right side) has a 
slightly smaller red area, representing a 
slightly decreased likelihood of death, 
but the yellow area, representing 
impotence or incontinence, is 
substantially enlarged.
    This dartboard model allows a 
patient (or physician) to respond 
directly to the choice offered by 
two different possible sets of risk, 
without having to rely on knowledge 
of numbers or percents, or having 
to assign artiﬁ  cial weights to various 
possible outcomes. The decision a 
patient makes in choosing at which 
dartboard he would prefer to throw 
his darts reﬂ  ects his personal value 
system, in that he will respond to the 
relative degree to which the landing 
areas are ﬁ  lled with what he believes to 
be desirable or undesirable outcomes. 
Most patients will intuitively understand 
that it is preferable to throw at a 
board where most of the outcomes 
are positive, and worse to throw at 
one with larger portions covered with 
negative outcomes, particularly as those 
outcomes become more and more 
undesirable (with paralysis being worse 
than itching, for example).
    Take for example a disease with a 
40% mortality, which can be halved by 
a pharmacologic treatment, and that in 
turn causes minor side effects in 10% 
of patients (Figure 3). Anyone looking 
at the probable outcome associated 
with the two competing management 
options (use or do not use the 
treatment) can easily see that the total 
area of potential bad outcomes is 
diminished with treatment, and that 
even the “bad” outcomes associated 
with treatment are less fearsome than 
for no treatment. Similarly, even if 
22% of patients develop a minor 
side effect with treatment (Figure 4), 
such that the overall green area is less 
with treatment, most patients will not 
need to make a conscious or explicit 
assignment of weights to “death” versus 
“minor side effects” to know that 
treatment is a more desirable choice.
    The situation is more complex, 
obviously, when the effects of two 
strategies are less straightforward, as in 
the case of prostate screening (Figure 
2). In this case, it is perfectly feasible 
that one reasonable patient, noticing 
that (based on the assumptions we 
have made for the purposes of this 
paper) death is slightly less likely with 
screening, might choose to throw at the 
screening dartboard, even though the 
overall possibility of any bad outcome is 
increased. Another rational individual, 
on the other hand, might choose the 
no-screening dartboard, responding 
to the very small decrease in area 
covered by “death” and the much 
larger increase in area covered with 
signiﬁ  cant morbidity.
    For the physician, the advantages of 
allowing a patient to choose, based on 
use of such a direct visual tool, should 
be manifest. Particularly as choices 
become more and more complex, 
we cannot know on what basis any 
individual patient would go about 
choosing between competing options, 
and we can only delude ourselves by 
attempting to model the unknowable. 
It must be better to let an individual 
ruminate and come to his own 
conclusion, based on his own personal 
preferences, while attempting to assure 
that he has sufﬁ  cient information 
as to the competing choices, and 
sufﬁ  cient knowledge to weigh the 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030137.g003
  Figure 3.   Dartboards of Relative Risks 
Associated with a Hypothetical Treatment   
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relative advantages and disadvantages 
presented on each board.
    There is, however, a problem with 
the dartboard metaphor, in that it 
makes it more difﬁ  cult for a patient 
to understand that his own outcome, 
from among the range of possibilities 
represented, will be due to chance 
because darts is a game of skill, not 
chance. Thus it is possible that a patient 
who chooses to aim at a particular 
dartboard precisely because it, among 
available options, has the smallest area 
marked “impotence,” may nevertheless 
become impotent. Many patients 
would undoubtedly assume that they 
could impact the possibility of any 
given outcome because of their “skill” 
at aiming their own particular dart at 
the target area. Many patients already 
believe in their own ability to “beat the 
odds,” and this type of magical thinking 
would likely be accentuated by the 
notion of a game of skill, such as darts.
    For that reason, we believe that 
the best version of this tool changes 
the terminology slightly so that the 
dartboard becomes a roulette wheel 
(Figure 5). For our interactive version, 
we have designed the tool to perform 
in the manner of an actual roulette 
wheel, so that for any given “spin” a 
ball turns around the board, and the 
spot at which the ball ultimately lands 
is entirely random. Most patients 
understand that there is no way to 
inﬂ  uence the ﬁ  nal outcome by any 
one spin of such a wheel, although 
physicians would of course need to 
reinforce the message that by choosing 
to take their spin at any given roulette 
wheel, patients could have any of the 
outcomes seen on the wheel, but that 
the likelihood of any given outcome 
would be directly proportional to the 
area on the wheel taken up by the 
outcome in question. Patients could 
therefore look at two side-by-side 
roulette wheels and determine under 
which circumstances they would most 
like to spin. Once again, some patients 
might choose a wheel that maximizes 
the possibility of a good outcome, even 
if it has a slightly higher proportion 
of surface with some terribly bad 
outcome such as death, while others 
might choose to spin at a wheel where 
there were many less-than-perfect 
outcomes but the chance of death was 
smaller.  
    It is possible that for some patients 
magical thinking could be applied 
even to the roulette wheel, such that 
they would believe that the outcome 
they obtain on a sample spin (or series 
of spins) in a physician’s ofﬁ  ce would 
predict what will actually happen to 
them should they choose to follow 
such a strategy “in real life.” It is also 
possible that other patients will object 
to using the roulette wheel because 
of religious (or other) objections to 
“gambling.” For both these reasons, 
it will be important for physicians to 
emphasize that the tool is designed 
only to demonstrate the likely potential 
hazards of alternate strategies, rather 
than to determine what will occur, for 
any individual patient, once a decision 
is made. Physicians may also choose to 
point out that, unlike the decision to go 
to a casino or racetrack, for example, 
no one can   avoid   making decisions 
about how to approach healthcare 
choices, or dealing with the potential 
risks and consequences associated 
with any given approach. Thus, using 
a tool like this has nothing to do with 
choosing to gamble with one’s health, 
but rather has everything to do with 
understanding better just what risks are 
involved when any of several potential 
strategies (including inaction) is 
adopted.
    We believe that the use of a tool 
like this, which would also allow for an 
inﬁ  nite number of sensitivity analyses, 
and updating as new information 
became available, would greatly help 
patients understand the choices they 
have to make without requiring them 
to resort to some outside surrogate 
against which they would have to 
interpret these choices. It would also 
allow them to make decisions without 
having to understand concepts like “3% 
chance of death” or “97% chance of 
survival” or “25% decrease in chance 
of death” or “2% absolute chance of 
decrease in likelihood of death.”
    Previous evaluations about the 
presentation of risk with visual tools 
are generally supportive of the use of 
visual tools for presenting risk [11,15], 
but this is not uniform, and there 
is also some concern that bias can 
result according to where on the chart 
(top or bottom) particular types of 
outcomes are placed [16]. We believe 
the dartboard is likely to diminish this 
concern, with risk information spread 
throughout the surface, and that the 
active roulette wheel is even less subject 
to this type of bias, as various outcomes 
end up on different parts of the surface 
in random, but proportionate, fashion 
following each spin.
    Of course, use of the roulette 
wheel will not by itself solve all of the 
problems involved in SDM. It is still 
only as good as both the quality and 
precision of the available evidence, and 
it requires physicians who are able to 
interpret accurately the meaning of 
such evidence. It requires that patients 
understand that all outcomes are 
possible, including those that are of low 
likelihood, even though risk does occur 
in general proportion to the space on 
the wheel. Finally, although changes 
can be made to any of the parameters 
used to calculate the size of various 
outcomes on the wheel, it is hard to 
demonstrate multiple concomitant 
outcomes, or to visualize all the possible 
variations that are reasonable based 
on the best evidence. An example 
of this might be as follows: when a 
patient chooses to have a PSA, this 
might lead to increased worry while he 
waits for the result. This can easily be 
represented graphically on the wheel 
by adding another outcome category. 
On the other hand, if the test returns 
with a negative result, this same patient 
might worry less, over a subsequent 
period of time, than a patient who 
chose not to have the PSA in the ﬁ  rst 
place. It would be very difﬁ  cult if 
not impossible to model all possible 
responses in such a manner, especially 
without resorting to efforts to assign 
weights to the “degree of worry” that 
each approach might entail—precisely 
the type of activity the roulette wheel 
is designed to avoid. Nevertheless, we 
believe that major possible outcomes, 
both in terms of harm and beneﬁ  t, can 
be visually represented using this device 
and, furthermore, that this can be 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030137.g004
  Figure 4.   Dartboards of Relative Risks 
Associated with a Hypothetical Treatment 
(as in Figure 3) but with the Incidence of 
Side Effects Doubled   
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done within a range of possibilities that 
are reasonable based on best available 
information.
    It goes without saying that the 
roulette wheel only addresses that 
aspect of SDM that has to do with 
the ability of patients to understand 
information. It cannot solve problems 
related to the absence of reliable 
information, misinterpretation of 
information, or complex interactions 
of outcomes. Nor can it, nor should 
it, remove the physician from the 
equation, or take the place of doctor–
patient discussions, which represent a 
substantial part of the contribution that 
physicians actually make when helping 
patients make important decisions. It 
can, however, help alleviate some of 
the substantial time pressures faced 
by physicians, by allowing patients 
to grapple with some of their own 
preferences and values independently, 
once appropriate data has been 
entered into the tool, prior to meeting 
with their physician, at which time 
questions can be raised, and areas of 
uncertainty addressed, without a need 
for the exhaustive review of risks and 
beneﬁ  ts associated with various choices 
that must underpin current attempts 
at SDM.
    In this paper we can only 
demonstrate a static version of 
the roulette wheel as a tool for 
understanding risk, but it is worth 
reemphasizing that an interactive 
version (http:⁄⁄edoctoring.ncl.ac.uk/
System_Check/psa_detect_html; click 
on “Roulette Wheels”) carries with 
it the further advantage of allowing 
physicians and patients to reconsider 
their opinions in light of uncertainty 
about the evidence, as well as once 
new evidence, or advances in diagnosis 
or treatment become available. 
Knowing, for example, that our 
point estimates are far from certain, 
a user of the tool could program 
it, quite easily, to show the relative 
outcomes presented by the “screen” 
and “no screen” options for a range 
of currently plausible assumptions. 
Some changed assumptions will 
favor one strategy, while others will 
do the opposite; seeing the range 
of possibilities, even for extremely 
favorable or extremely unfavorable 
assumptions, might be useful in 
helping some individuals reﬁ  ne their 
decision.
    Even more importantly, this tool 
allows for rational adjustments based 
on new information, as it becomes 
available. The development of a 
more accurate screening test, or a 
more effective therapy for cancer, 
or a new intervention with a better 
adverse effect proﬁ  le, would each 
be immediately and easily amenable 
to revisions in the paired roulette 
wheels, and viewers could reconsider 
the options in light of the new 
information. This would be hardly 
necessary in the face of dramatic 
advances, such as a new test that 
identiﬁ  es only those cancers likely 
to become clinically relevant, or 
a new surgical technique that has 
no morbidity. But it would be of 
great value when considering new 
interventions that produce “advances” 
that are far more subtle: the roulette 
wheel could be a great help in 
understanding the impact of a new 
screening test shown to identify 
far fewer of the types of cancer 
that generally remain indolent for 
many years, but at the cost of lesser 
sensitivity for clinically important 
disease, or of a new therapy that 
produces far less impotence, but only 
decreases ﬁ  ve-year, but not ten-year, 
mortality. (For ofﬁ  ces able to use only 
the static version of the tool, it does 
contain a “warning” that it is based 
on the best information available as 
of a given date, the accuracy of which 
should be periodically revisited.)
    For physicians and their patients 
to make informed decisions, they 
must not only have access to the best 
available information, but also must 
also understand what it means, as 
well as the possible consequences 
of the choices open to them. Like 
others, we believe that visual tools 
can be an extremely useful part 
of this process, particularly when 
they allow us to bypass the need to 
understand numerical probabilities, 
or to “translate” such numbers into 
artiﬁ  cial and often equally obscure 
surrogate “utilities” [11,17–19]. The 
programmable “roulette wheel” tool 
described in this paper should allow 
patients and physicians to incorporate 
directly their own values about 
competing beneﬁ  ts and competing 
harms, and thus lead to choices that are 
most consistent with their aspirations 
and fears, as well as with the best 
available evidence, even as it changes 
over time.   
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030137.g005 
  Figure 5.   Roulette Wheels of Relative Risks 
for an Average 65-Year-Old Man, whether or 
Not He Opts for PSA Screening for Prostate 
Cancer
      Based on the best information available as of 
November 2005, the accuracy of which should 
be periodically revisited. 
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